Abstract-Without physical boundaries, a wireless network faces many more vulnerabilities than a wired network does. IEEE802.16 provides a security sublayer in the MAC layer to address the privacy issues across the fixed BWA (Broadband Wireless Access). Several articles have been published to address the flaws in IEEE802.16 security after IEEE802.16-2001 was released. However, even the enhanced version IEEE802. does not settle all the problems and additional flaws emerge. In addition, we found that PKM (Privacy and Key Management) protocols version 2 (PKMv2), proposed by recently released IEEE802.16e, is also vulnerable to new attacks. In this paper, we first overview the IEEE802.16 standard, especially the security sublayer, and then investigate possible attacks on the basic PKM protocol in IEEE802.16 as well as in its other versions from related works and the newest PKMv2. We also give possible solutions to counter those attacks and verify our analysis using formal (BAN) logic.
INTRODUCTION
As a member of IEEE 802 group, IEEE 802.16 is the standard to specify the air interface of fixed BWA. IEEE standard 802.16 [1] was first designed to provide the last mile for Wireless Metropolitan Area Network (WMAN) with lineof-sight (LOS) working at 10-66GHz bands. The latest version, IEEE standard 802. [2] , which consolidates previous standards, also supports non-line-of-sight (NLOS) within 2-1 1GHz bands and mesh nodes. The recently released amendment, IEEE 802.16e, aims to provide mobility in WMAN.
In a WMAN, both the Base Station (BS) and Subscriber Station (SS) face almost all those attacks as their wired counterparts do. Moreover, wireless networks are inherently less secure due to the lack of physical infrastructure. The 802.16 standard specifies a security sublayer at the bottom of the MAC layer. This security sublayer provides SS with privacy and protects BS from service hijacking. There are two component protocols in the security sublayer: an encapsulation protocol for encrypting packet data across the fixed BWA (Broadband Wireless Access), and a PKM (Privacy and Key Management) protocol for providing the secure distribution of keying data from BS to SS as well as enabling BS to enforce conditional access to network services.
The IEEE 802.16 PKM protocol uses X.509 digital certificates, RSA public-key algorithm, and strong encryption algorithm to perform key exchanges between SS and BS, at client/server model. IEEE 802.16 PKM employs two-tier key systems. The Authentication Protocol first authenticates SS to BS, establishing a shared secret (Authorization Key, AK) via public-key cryptography; then via Key Management Protocol, SS registers to the network, during which AK is used to secure the exchange of Transport Encryption Keys (TEK).
A certificate sent by SS allows BS to authenticate a legitimate SS. On the other hand, SS also needs to authenticate BS to keep away from malicious ones. [4] and [5] . However In our previous paper [7] , we have analyzed security issues on the basic PKM protocols and proposed some solutions. Recently, PKM version 2 (PKMv2) is proposed in 802.16e standard, which will be publicly available in August 2006. References [8] and [9] are comments for this new amendment. We do not find any other analysis about this protocol till now. However, there are many works on protocols based on X.509, such as [10] , [11] , [12] and [13] . Some discussions about the Authentication Protocols in earlier versions of PKM in [7] are also included in this paper, both because they are related to our later discussions in this paper Fig. 1 . In Fig. 1 B. Attacks on Basic PKM Authenctication Protocol BS will face replay attack from malicious SS, who intercepts and saves the messages sent by a legal SS previously. We name this attack Simple Replay Attack. We call it simple because, unlike other replay attacks which usually require more tricks to succeed, Simple Replay Attack only involves falsifying instances of the request message. In [11] , when analyzing Kerberos Protocol, the authors claim it is common for designers not to focus on such kind of attacks. They regard it as vulnerability but not serious flaw. However, we find it is not the same situation for PKM Protocols in IEEE802. 16 , in which it may lead to a severe result. The reason is that, if BS set a timeout value which makes itself to reject Auth-REQ from the same SS in a certain period, the legal request from the victim SS will also be ignored. Therefore, the Deny of Service occurs to the victim SS. Otherwise, if BS accept the request, it will have to generate new AK for SS, which usually involved nonce information. This will exhaust BS' capabilities. To avoid these replay attacks, we suggest adding timestamps in message 2, together with a signature by SS.
Similarly, message 3 also endangers SS in replay attacks. Even worse, malicious BS can make its own Auth-Reply message with the AK generated by itself, thus gaining the control of the communication of the victim SS. This is a typical Man-in-the-Middle attack, which brings forward the need of mutual authentication, i.e., SS needs to authenticate BS as well. This can be done by adding BS' certificate in message 3. The revised protocol with the proposed modifications is shown in Fig. 2 . Nonce is a possible alternative to timestamp in the authentication protocol. In [6] , the authors use nonce instead of timestamp. Their protocol is shown in Fig. 3 . Fig. 4 . SSID is SS's identifier from Cert (SS); AAID is the ID of Authorized Association (AA); SSAddr is the MAC address of SS. In fact, there are three optional protocols for X.509 certificate: one-way, two-way, and three-way authentication. Although the original IEEE 802.16 authentication protocol involves two messages1, it is still a one-way authentication, because it only provides SS' certificate to BS. Our modified version and Intel Nonce version can be regarded as two-way authentication, which provide mutual authentication between communication parties. The PKMv2 belongs to the three-way authentication, with a confirmation message from SS to BS.
In X.509 certification, both timestamp and nonce are used. That is because the timestamp in X.509 is not used as a kind of nonce but as a lifetime, which includes start time (optional) and end time to prevent delayed sending. Therefore a nonce, which is unique during the lifetime, is also used to prevent replay attack. We have already shown that timestamp is critical for the one-way and two-way authentication protocols in previous subsections. In order to prevent falsifying and replay, the signature by SS is also necessary, which is included in the X.509 as well as in our modified 802.16 authentication protocol.
In three-way authentication, the Nonce NB is included in the last message from SS to BS. It seems not necessary to check the timestamp any more, because the nonces from both parties are sent back to each other, thus both parties can check the replied nonce to prevent replay attack. This method is usually applied when there is no synchronized clock. Details discussion can be found in [14] and related IETF drafts.
Due to the reason above, the original description of the protocol [15] claimed that BS does not need to check the timestamp Ts. However, several defects have been found by many researchers' work, such as [10] , [12] [10] , which is classified as Interleaving Attack in [16] . We elaborate it here for PKMv2. We assume the request message is already signed by SS. In fact, the signature will not help much for those nonce versions. We also omit the informative message 1 from original protocol and omit non-critical parts in those messages for conciseness. Following figure shows the scenario of this attack. In Fig. 5 A new attack on original X.509 3-way authentic protocol is found by [17] , even if it checks the timestamp author calls it Multiplicity Attack, where one agei mistaken about the multiplicity of sessions. This attack celiminated by adding BS's identity also.
Through the discussion above, we can conclude certificate from BS and signature by SS is critical t versions of those authentication protocols. Timestamp is necessary to Basic PKM and Intel version, but it ca omitted in PKMv2 only after the PKMv2 is mod However, the Simple Replay Attack is still feasible t( modified PKMv2. Comparing with our modified version timestamp, the modified PKMv2 does not involve timest thus the message may be a little more concise, and wil depend much on synchronized clock. While our moc version only involves two messages compared to 3 mesĩ n PKMv2. Less number of exchanged messages is al essential to authentication protocols. Besides, synchroniz is not a problem for applying timestamp here due tc inherence of IEEE802.16, because SS and BS have ali synchronized during initial ranging. Moreover, our mod protocol is resistant to Simple Replay Attack.
IV. FORMAL ANALYSIS USING BAN LOGIC
In this section, we formally verify our analysis on diff versions of PKM protocols, and the correctness of our re version, using BAN logic. Due to space limitation, we ca illustrate the meaning of symbols and postulates in BAN in this section. Interested readers can check [10] (12) SS J=-#(NSS) (13), BS J=-#(NBS) (14) 55|-#(TBS) (15) , BSI-#(TSS) (16) Note that not every protocol needs all of these assumptions. As to the Basic PKM, the reasonable assumptions are (4) , (5), (8) , (9), (10) , and (12) . The formal analysis of Basic PKM is performed as follows: BS sees (1), (4) (6) This will also apply to later analysis on other versions. Now we can continue the procedure:
(28), (9) by jurisdiction rule: The future work will be pursued in two directions. First, more work needs to be done about formal analysis of authentication protocols. BAN logic could do verification and help find some flaws, but it also depends much on manual idealization and formalization which are regarded as hard work for researchers. Analysis procedure is also an onerous work, especially for complicated protocols. Thus we want to use some model-checking tools such as FDR (Failures Divergence Refinement) [18] , which is suitable for process algebra CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [19] , to analyze authentication protocols automatically. Second, there are also many security protocols for multicast and mobility in WMAN, which is proposed in 802.16e. We will analyze them as well as soon as they are available.
